



# HOUSE OF FRASER

SINCE 1849

## **Inside the Frasers Empire: Mike Ashley, Corporate Architecture, and the Mechanics of Extraction**

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## Introduction

Mike Ashley's rise from a single sports shop in Maidenhead to the architect of one of Britain's most sprawling retail empires is a story of opportunism, distressed-asset acquisition, and a corporate structure designed for maximum internal control. Sports Direct, now rebranded as Frasers Group, has become synonymous with aggressive takeovers, opaque accounting, and a pattern of value extraction that critics describe as a form of retail asset stripping.

We examine how Ashley built his empire, how the internal machinery functions, and why so many of the brands he acquires end up hollowed out, restructured, or dissolved. It also includes a detailed case study tracing the pattern through House of Fraser, Karrimor, and USC.

Although Mike Ashley stepped down as CEO in 2022, his influence remains embedded in the DNA of Frasers Group. He retains a major shareholding and continues to shape strategy through his private holding companies and his proximity to the current CEO, Michael Murray.

Frasers Group itself is a labyrinth of subsidiaries. Intellectual property sits in one company, retail leases in another, warehousing in a third, and e-commerce operations in yet another. This fragmentation is not accidental. It creates a structure in which assets can be moved, liabilities isolated, and profits channelled through internal pathways that are difficult for outsiders to trace.

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
# THE EXTRACTION MACHINE:

## Inside the Frasers Group Empire

### The Architecture of Control

The Frasers Group empire is not a retail business in the conventional sense. It is a financial machine built to acquire distressed brands, extract their valuable components, and redeploy them inside a protected internal ecosystem. The public sees a constellation of familiar names: House of Fraser, Flannels, Sports Direct, Karrimor, Everlast, Jack Wills, Slazenger. Behind the scenes lies a lattice of subsidiaries, holding companies, and intellectual-property silos that allow assets to be moved, liabilities to be isolated, and profits to be channelled with extraordinary precision.

Mike Ashley's genius was not in reinventing retail but in understanding that the value of a brand often survives long after the company that owns it collapses. By separating intellectual property from operations, and by using internal licensing fees to shift profits between entities, he built a system capable of harvesting value even from hollowed-out brands.



# Timeline of Key Acquisitions and Structural Moves

## Early 2000s

Acquisition of Donnay, Slazenger, Dunlop, Karrimor, Kangol. Intellectual property moved into dedicated subsidiaries. Brands relaunched as budget lines.

## 2004–2006

Expansion of the IP-holding structure. Consolidation of logistics into centralised warehouses.

## 2007

Sports Direct IPO. Ashley extracts £1.8 billion. Group begins aggressive acquisition strategy.

## 2011–2013

Acquisition of Everlast, Lonsdale, Firetrap, and other distressed brands. IP separation becomes standard practice.

## 2014

Acquisition of USC. Pre-pack administration in 2015. Stock and IP transferred before collapse.

## 2016–2017

Acquisition of Flannels and expansion into luxury retail. IP and retail operations separated.

## 2018

Acquisition of House of Fraser for £90 million. Immediate transfer of IP and online assets into new subsidiaries.

## 2019

Rebrand to Frasers Group. Auditor resigns. Belgian tax bill emerges. Corporate opacity becomes a public issue.




## 2020–2022

Acquisition of Jack Wills, Evans Cycles, Sofa.com, and other distressed retailers. Pattern of IP extraction continues.

## 2023–2024

Expansion of Flannels and Frasers department stores. Continued acquisition of distressed brands and strategic property assets.

## Flow of Assets, Liabilities, and Profits Inside the Frasers Group



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## The Intellectual Property Engine

At the centre of the Frasers model is the intellectual property holding company. When the group acquires a brand, the first move is almost always the same: the trademarks, logos, and brand rights are transferred into a clean subsidiary with no operational liabilities. This entity exists solely to own the name.

The operating companies — the ones that run stores, employ staff, manage warehouses, and deal with suppliers — must then pay licensing fees to use the brand. These fees are internal transfers, but they have real consequences. They allow profits to be concentrated in the IP-holding company, which has almost no costs, while the operating companies carry the financial risks of retail.


This structure is particularly powerful when a brand is acquired out of administration. The intellectual property can be extracted from the failing company before the rest of the business collapses. The brand can then be relaunched under a new subsidiary, free of debt, while the old company's creditors are left behind.

## The Mechanics of Internal Licensing

Internal licensing is the quiet engine of the Frasers Group. The IP-holding company charges the operating subsidiary a fee — often a percentage of sales — for the right to use the brand. Because the IP-holding company has no staff, no stores, and no supply chain, these fees flow through as pure profit.

The operating company, meanwhile, absorbs the costs of production, logistics, labour, and retail. This arrangement allows Frasers Group to shift profits away from high-risk entities and into protected subsidiaries. It also allows the group to present a fragmented financial picture to auditors, regulators, and creditors. A retail subsidiary may appear unprofitable because it is paying high licensing fees, while the IP-holding company appears highly profitable despite having no operational activity.

The structure becomes even more potent when combined with intercompany loans. A profitable IP-holding company can lend money to a struggling retail subsidiary, creating a web of internal debt that further complicates the financial landscape. If the retail subsidiary later collapses, the internal loan becomes a claim against the insolvent estate, giving the group priority over external creditors.



## **Case Study:**

### **Karrimor and the Disappearance of a Heritage Brand**

Karrimor was once a respected British outdoor brand known for technical innovation and high-quality equipment. When Ashley acquired it, the company was already weakened, but its name still carried weight. The intellectual property was quickly transferred into a dedicated Sports Direct subsidiary. The original Karrimor company, burdened with manufacturing costs and legacy liabilities, was allowed to fade out.

The brand was then relaunched as a budget line sold almost exclusively through Sports Direct stores. The operating companies purchased low-cost goods from overseas factories and paid licensing fees to the IP-holding company. The result was a brand that generated profit through licensing while the operating companies carried the costs and risks of retail. The original Karrimor identity disappeared, replaced by a label engineered for margin extraction.

### **USC and the Pre-Pack Playbook**

The USC case provides one of the clearest examples of how intellectual property separation can be used during insolvency. In 2015, USC was placed into administration. Hours before the collapse, its stock and brand assets were transferred to another Ashley-controlled entity. The original USC company was left with debts but no meaningful assets. Staff were given minutes' notice of redundancy.

Immediately after the administration, Ashley repurchased the brand and reopened stores under a new subsidiary. The intellectual property remained intact because it had been moved before the collapse. The new company paid licensing fees to the IP-holding entity, while the old company's creditors were left with little recourse. A parliamentary inquiry later described the process as "extremely concerning," but it was legally permissible.

### **House of Fraser and the Post-Acquisition Rebuild**

When House of Fraser collapsed in 2018, Ashley purchased it for £90 million. The acquisition was followed by a rapid internal reorganisation. The House of Fraser name, online platform, and customer data were transferred into new Frasers Group entities. The legacy company, burdened with unpaid supplier invoices and pension obligations, remained separate.

The new IP-holding company licensed the House of Fraser name back to the group's retail operations. Stores that remained open paid internal fees to use the brand, while the liabilities of the old company stayed quarantined. The brand survived, but the company that once owned it did not.

## The Logistics Spine


The Frasers Group logistics network is the physical counterpart to its financial architecture. Warehousing is centralised in vast distribution centres that serve multiple brands simultaneously. This centralisation allows the group to strip out the existing logistics infrastructure of acquired companies and replace it with its own. It also allows the group to charge internal handling and storage fees, creating another channel for profit extraction.

The logistics subsidiaries are structured to be low-risk and high-control. They rarely carry significant debt, and they are insulated from the liabilities of the retail subsidiaries they serve. This separation ensures that even if a retail brand collapses, the logistics spine remains intact.

## The High-Street Harvest

The Frasers Group model is built for a collapsing high street. As traditional retailers struggle with rising rents, declining footfall, and the shift to online shopping, Ashley's empire thrives by acquiring their remnants. The group's ability to strip out liabilities, centralise operations, and redeploy intellectual property allows it to extract value from brands that would otherwise disappear.

This model raises profound questions about corporate responsibility, creditor protection, and the future of retail. It also reveals the extent to which the high street has become a landscape of financial engineering rather than commerce.



# **Audit Failures and the Limits of Regulatory Scrutiny**

The financial architecture of Frasers Group has long strained the capacity of auditors and regulators to keep pace with its complexity. What appears from the outside to be a sprawling retail conglomerate is, internally, a dense network of subsidiaries, intercompany loans, intellectual-property silos, and opaque financial transfers. This structure is not merely difficult to audit; it is designed to be difficult to audit. Over the past decade, the group's auditors have resigned, regulators have issued warnings, and parliamentary committees have launched inquiries, yet the underlying system has remained largely intact.

The story of audit failure at Frasers Group is not a tale of a single scandal or a single misstatement. It is the story of a corporate architecture that pushes the boundaries of what traditional auditing can meaningfully capture. It is also the story of a regulatory environment that has struggled to respond to a business model built on speed, opportunism, and structural opacity.

## **I. The Auditor Who Walked Away**

In 2019, Grant Thornton resigned as auditor of Sports Direct after a series of escalating concerns. The resignation was extraordinary: auditors rarely walk away from FTSE-listed companies, and when they do, it signals deep structural issues. The immediate trigger was a delayed annual report and the sudden discovery of a £605 million Belgian tax bill that had not been disclosed to the auditor until the eleventh hour.

Grant Thornton told MPs that the group's internal systems were "inadequate" and that the company had been "uncooperative" in providing information. The firm also revealed that it had been unable to obtain sufficient evidence about the group's complex network of subsidiaries and intercompany transactions.

The resignation left Sports Direct without an auditor for months. Several major audit firms — including the Big Four — declined to take on the account. Some cited conflicts of interest. Others, more candidly, expressed discomfort with the group's governance and opacity.

For a FTSE-listed company to be effectively un-auditable was unprecedented.

## **II. The Belgian Tax Bill and the Question of Transparency**

The £605 million Belgian tax bill became a symbol of the group's internal opacity. The liability related to VAT treatment on goods moved through Belgium — a jurisdiction often used by multinational retailers for logistical and tax-efficiency reasons.

What alarmed auditors was not the bill itself but the fact that it had been concealed until the night before the annual results were due to be published. Grant Thornton told MPs that they had been blindsided. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) later opened an investigation into the auditor's handling of the case, but the deeper issue remained: how could a liability of that magnitude exist within the group without being visible to its own auditors?

The answer lies in the group's internal structure. With hundreds of subsidiaries, many of them dormant, and with intellectual property, logistics, retail operations, and international arms all held in separate entities, liabilities can be siloed in ways that make them difficult to detect. The Belgian bill was not an anomaly; it was a symptom.

### **III. Parliamentary Scrutiny and the Limits of Oversight**

Sports Direct has been summoned before parliamentary committees' multiple times. The most high-profile inquiry followed the 2015 USC administration, when MPs accused the company of using pre-pack insolvency to shed liabilities while preserving assets. During the hearings, MPs described the group's corporate structure as "deliberately opaque" and "designed to shield the truth."

The committee also examined labour practices at the Shirebrook warehouse, where workers were subjected to punitive conditions and excessive surveillance. While this inquiry focused on employment law rather than accounting, it revealed the same pattern: a company operating at the edge of regulatory visibility, using complexity as a shield.

Despite the strong language used by MPs, the inquiries resulted in few structural changes. The group made public commitments to improve governance, but the underlying architecture — the separation of intellectual property, the use of intercompany loans, the strategic deployment of pre-pack administrations — remained untouched.

### **IV. The FRC and the Challenge of Policing Complexity**

The Financial Reporting Council has repeatedly investigated both Sports Direct and its auditors. Yet the FRC's powers are limited. It can fine auditors, issue reprimands, and demand improvements in reporting, but it cannot force a company to simplify its structure or prevent it from using aggressive internal transfers.

In 2020, the FRC criticised the group for failing to disclose related-party transactions involving companies connected to Mike Ashley. The regulator found that the group had not adequately reported payments to entities controlled by Ashley's brother. The company argued that the omissions were inadvertent. The FRC disagreed but imposed only modest sanctions.

The episode highlighted a recurring problem: the group's internal transactions are so numerous and so intertwined that even identifying related parties becomes a forensic exercise. Regulators can demand disclosure, but they cannot compel clarity.

### **V. Why the System Persists**

The persistence of audit failures and regulatory scrutiny is not the result of negligence. It is the result of a corporate architecture that outpaces the tools designed to oversee it. Traditional auditing assumes that a company's structure reflects its operations. Frasers Group inverts that assumption. Its structure reflects its strategy: to separate value from risk to isolate liabilities, and to move assets through internal channels that are technically compliant but practically opaque.

Regulators can investigate individual failures, but they cannot easily address the systemic design. Auditors can resign, but they cannot force the company to simplify. The result is a stalemate: a company that remains within the letter of the law while operating in a space that the law was not built to govern.

## **VI. The Broader Implications**

The Frasers Group model exposes a fault line in modern corporate governance. As companies become more complex, and as distressed-asset acquisition becomes a dominant strategy in retail, the traditional mechanisms of oversight struggle to keep pace. The high street is no longer a landscape of shops; it is a landscape of financial structures.

Frasers Group is not an outlier. It is a preview of what happens when financial engineering becomes the organising principle of retail. The audit failures and regulatory struggles surrounding the company are not anomalies; they are warnings.

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# The Consumer Illusion: Why the Public Doesn't See the Extraction Machine

The most disorienting feature of the extraction model is that it leaves the *surface* of the high street intact. Consumers walk past familiar signage — House of Fraser, Jack Wills, Evans Cycles, USC — and assume continuity. The illusion works because the extraction model preserves the brand shell while hollowing out the underlying business.

**Three forces sustain this illusion:**

## 1. Brand Continuity Masks Corporate Collapse

A brand is a cultural artefact. It carries memory, trust, and emotional recognition. When Frasers Group acquires a distressed retailer, the first move is to extract the intellectual property into a clean subsidiary. The public sees the same logo; they do not see the liquidation of the company that once owned it.

The brand survives.

The business does not.

Consumers cannot see the difference.

## 2. Storefront Survival Creates a False Sense of Rescue

When a Frasers-owned brand reopens after administration, it appears to have been “saved.” In reality, the rescue is selective: the liabilities are left behind, the profitable components are absorbed, and the new entity operates inside the group’s centralised machinery.

To the public, the reopened store looks like continuity.

In practice, it is a reanimated shell.

## 3. The High Street Has Been Financialised Beyond Public Visibility

Consumers still imagine retail as a simple chain of shops selling goods. They do not see:

- internal licensing fees
- intercompany loans
- IP silos
- logistics consolidation
- pre-pack transfers

The machinery is invisible by design. The public sees a shop; the conglomerate sees an asset-harvesting node.

The result is a high street that feels familiar but is structurally unrecognisable. The consumer illusion is not a failure of perception — it is the intended outcome of a system that preserves the appearance of commerce while replacing its substance with extraction.

## How the Extraction Model Reshapes the UK High Street

The British high street has been collapsing for more than a decade, but the Frasers Group model has accelerated and reshaped that collapse in ways that are still not fully understood. What looks like a rescue operation — the acquisition of failing brands, the preservation of familiar names, the reopening of shuttered stores — is, in practice, a transformation of the high street from a network of independent commercial ecosystems into a landscape dominated by a single extraction-driven conglomerate.

The traditional high street retailer was a self-contained organism. It owned its brand, its stock, its leases, its staff contracts, and its supply chain. When it failed, the entire organism failed. The Frasers model disassembles that organism into components: intellectual property, logistics, retail operations, e-commerce, and physical real estate. Each component is then slotted into the group's internal machinery, where it becomes part of a larger system designed to extract value rather than preserve the integrity of the original business.

This disassembly has profound consequences for the high street. Brands that once anchored local economies — House of Fraser, Jack Wills, Evans Cycles, USC — now exist as shells within a centralised corporate architecture. Their stores may remain open, but they no longer function as independent entities. They are nodes in a distribution network controlled from Shirebrook, their identities flattened into interchangeable revenue streams.

The result is a high street that appears superficially alive but is structurally hollow. The familiar names remain, but the underlying businesses have been replaced by a system that prioritises internal efficiency over local presence. The high street becomes a stage set: the signage unchanged, the interiors refurbished, but the economic logic entirely transformed.

This transformation also affects competition. Independent retailers and mid-sized chains cannot match the cost efficiencies of a conglomerate that centralises logistics, strips out liabilities, and uses internal licensing to shift profits. The Frasers model does not merely survive the collapse of the high street; it feeds on it. Every administration becomes an opportunity. Every distressed brand becomes a potential asset. Every empty unit becomes a site for expansion.

The long-term consequence is a high street dominated by a handful of extraction-driven entities, each operating with a level of structural advantage that regulators have not yet learned to address. The diversity that once defined British retail — the mix of local shops, regional chains, and national brands — is replaced by a monoculture of conglomerate-owned labels. The high street becomes less a marketplace and more a distribution channel.

This is not regeneration. It is consolidation. And it marks a shift in the very purpose of the high street: from a space of community commerce to a platform for corporate extraction.

## The Political Economy of Distressed-Asset Retail

The rise of distressed-asset retail is not simply a business story. It is a political-economic phenomenon shaped by austerity, deregulation, commercial real-estate speculation, and the financialisation of everyday life. The Frasers Group model sits at the centre of this transformation, not because it created the conditions for distressed-asset retail, but because it exploits them with unmatched precision.

The political economy of this model begins with the collapse of mid-market retail. Years of stagnant wages, rising living costs, and the shift to online shopping eroded the customer base of traditional high-street chains. At the same time, commercial landlords — many of them pension funds and private-equity vehicles — refused to reduce rents, preferring to keep units empty rather than reprice their portfolios. The result was a wave of insolvencies that created a steady supply of distressed brands.

Into this landscape stepped companies like Frasers Group, whose business model depends on the availability of failing retailers. The political economy of distress becomes a pipeline: austerity reduces consumer spending; high rents push retailers into administration; distressed brands become acquisition targets; conglomerates extract value from their remnants; and the cycle repeats.

This cycle is reinforced by the legal and regulatory framework surrounding insolvency. Pre-pack administrations, which allow a company to be sold immediately after entering insolvency, enable the transfer of assets without the transfer of liabilities. Intellectual property can be extracted, stock can be moved, and leases can be renegotiated, while suppliers, landlords, and workers are left behind. The law does not merely permit this; it facilitates it.

Distressed-asset retail also intersects with the financialisation of property. Many high-street buildings are owned by investment vehicles whose primary concern is not retail viability but asset valuation. These landlords often prefer a large, covenant-strong tenant — even one that uses aggressive restructuring tactics — over a diverse mix of smaller retailers. The Frasers Group, with its scale and its willingness to take over large units, becomes a preferred tenant in a system that prioritises financial stability over commercial diversity.

The political economy of distressed-asset retail is therefore a story of misaligned incentives. Retailers fail because the economic environment is hostile. Conglomerates thrive because the legal environment rewards extraction. Landlords maintain high rents because their portfolios depend on it. Regulators struggle to intervene because the system is technically compliant. And consumers continue to shop in stores that appear unchanged, unaware that the underlying business has been replaced by a financial mechanism.

In this landscape, the Frasers Group model is not an aberration. It is the logical outcome of a system that has turned retail into a form of asset harvesting. The high street becomes a site where value is extracted rather than created, where brands are preserved but businesses are not, and where the appearance of continuity masks a deeper economic transformation.

## **International Parallels: The Extraction Model Is Not a British Anomaly**

While Frasers Group is the most visible UK example, the underlying architecture — distressed-asset acquisition, IP extraction, liability isolation, and brand reanimation — is part of a global shift in retail capitalism. Two international cases illustrate the pattern.

### **United States: Authentic Brands Group (ABG)**

ABG has built an empire by acquiring the intellectual property of collapsing American retailers — Forever 21, Barneys New York, Brooks Brothers, Reebok — and converting them into licensing engines.

The model mirrors Frasers Group:

- IP is separated from operations
- operating companies pay licensing fees
- stores are reopened under new subsidiaries
- liabilities remain with the insolvent estate

Barneys New York is the clearest example: the iconic luxury retailer collapsed, its IP was extracted, and the brand now exists as a licensing asset detached from its historic business.

The American high street (malls, department stores, mid-market chains) has become a graveyard of brands kept alive as financial instruments.

### **Germany: The Galeria Karstadt Kaufhof Cycle**

Germany's largest department store chain has undergone repeated insolvencies under private-equity ownership. Each cycle follows a familiar pattern:

- assets are separated from liabilities
- real estate is extracted into separate vehicles
- the operating company collapses
- the brand is relaunched in a slimmed-down form

The public sees the same name above the door.

Behind the scenes, the company has been dismantled and reassembled multiple times.

This is not a rescue model — it is a recurring extraction cycle.

## **Why These Parallels Matter**

The international examples show that the Frasers model is not an eccentricity of British retail. It is part of a global political economy in which:

- brands are more valuable than businesses
- insolvency is a strategy, not a failure

- IP is the primary asset
- retail becomes a platform for financial engineering

The UK high street is not alone. It is simply one of the clearest, most visible theatres of a global shift from commerce to extraction.

## **Conclusion: Toward a Manifesto for a Post-Extraction High Street**

The investigation into Frasers Group reveals far more than the internal workings of a single conglomerate. It exposes the underlying logic of a retail system that has drifted from commerce into financial engineering, from community infrastructure into asset harvesting, from public value into private extraction. The high street did not collapse by accident. It was reshaped by a political economy that rewarded consolidation, tolerated opacity, and allowed distressed-asset empires to flourish in the vacuum left by austerity, deregulation, and commercial real-estate speculation.

The Frasers model is the clearest expression of this shift. It is a system built on the separation of value from risk, the isolation of liabilities, and the redeployment of intellectual property as a financial instrument rather than a cultural asset. It thrives on the failure of others. It feeds on insolvency. It converts collapse into opportunity. It preserves the appearance of continuity — the familiar signage, the recognisable brands — while hollowing out the underlying businesses and replacing them with a machinery of extraction.

This is not regeneration. It is a form of corporate necromancy: the reanimation of dead brands for the purpose of value extraction. The high street becomes a mausoleum of names that no longer correspond to the companies that built them. The public walks through a landscape of ghosts.

The consequences extend far beyond retail. When brands become assets rather than institutions, when insolvency becomes a strategy rather than a failure, when the law becomes a toolkit for shedding obligations rather than protecting stakeholders, the social fabric of commerce begins to fray. Workers lose stability. Suppliers lose leverage. Communities lose anchors. Consumers lose trust. And regulators lose visibility.

The manifesto that emerges from this investigation is not a nostalgic plea for the return of the old high street. It is a call for a new economic architecture — one that recognises the high street as a public good, not merely a commercial zone; one that treats brands as cultural assets, not disposable shells; one that demands transparency from conglomerates that operate across hundreds of subsidiaries; one that protects workers, suppliers, and communities from the fallout of extraction-driven business models.

The future of the high street will not be secured by sentiment. It will be secured by structural reform. And that reform begins with understanding the machinery of extraction — how it works, why it persists, and what must change to dismantle it.

## **The Future of Regulation: What It Would Take to Challenge the Extraction Model**

Challenging the Frasers Group model — and the broader political economy of distressed-asset retail — requires more than incremental regulatory adjustments. It requires a fundamental rethinking of how insolvency, corporate governance, and retail oversight function in the UK. The current system was built for a different era: an era of self-contained companies, transparent balance sheets, and retail businesses that owned their own operations. It was not built for conglomerates that operate through webs of subsidiaries, shift profits through internal licensing, and use pre-pack administrations as strategic tools.

The first regulatory frontier is transparency. The opacity of intercompany transactions, intellectual-property transfers, and internal loans makes it difficult for auditors, creditors, and regulators to understand where value is created and where risk is concentrated. A future regulatory framework would need to require real-time disclosure of related-party transactions, mandatory reporting of internal licensing arrangements, and public registers of intellectual-property ownership within corporate groups. Without transparency, oversight is impossible.

The second frontier is insolvency reform. Pre-pack administrations allow companies to shed liabilities while preserving assets, often at the expense of workers, suppliers, and landlords. A reformed system would need to impose stricter scrutiny on pre-pack sales, require independent valuation of transferred assets, and mandate that intellectual property cannot be moved out of a failing company without creditor oversight. The law must prevent the extraction of value from insolvent companies while leaving stakeholders behind.

The third frontier is corporate structure. Conglomerates like Frasers Group use subsidiary fragmentation to isolate liabilities and protect assets. Regulators could require large corporate groups to publish consolidated maps of their internal structures, including the purpose of each subsidiary and the flow of assets between them. They could also impose limits on the use of dormant companies and require justification for the separation of intellectual property from operating entities.

The fourth frontier is labour and supply-chain protection. The extraction model externalises risk onto workers and suppliers. Regulators could introduce mandatory worker-protection provisions in insolvency cases, require supply-chain continuity plans for large retailers, and impose penalties on companies that use restructuring to avoid obligations to staff or creditors.

The final frontier is competition policy. The consolidation of distressed brands under a single conglomerate reshapes the high street and reduces market diversity. Regulators could treat distressed-asset acquisitions as mergers subject to competition review, assessing not only market share but also the systemic impact on local economies and retail ecosystems.

Challenging the extraction model is not about punishing a single company. It is about recognising that the current regulatory framework enables and incentivises extraction. The future of the high street depends on a regulatory architecture that understands the strategies of modern conglomerates, anticipates their manoeuvres, and protects the public interest.

The Frasers Group model will not be dismantled by accident. It will be dismantled by design — through transparency, accountability, structural reform, and a recognition that the high street is more than a marketplace. It is a civic institution. And it deserves a regulatory system that treats it as such.



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