Sustainability as Power: US Cotton Subsidies, BCI, and the Struggle for Equity in African Cotton Markets

Introduction

The global cotton sector is frequently presented as a domain where sustainability, development and market efficiency converge to improve outcomes for producers and the environment. Yet this narrative obscures the extent to which the industry is structured by entrenched geopolitical and commercial power relations that determine who benefits from global trade and who remains marginalised. Nowhere is this more visible than in the intersection of US cotton subsidies, the governance architecture of the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), and the counter‑model offered by Cotton made in Africa (CmiA). Sustainability standards are often framed as neutral mechanisms for improving agricultural practices, but they operate within a global market already distorted by Northern agricultural policy and dominated by multinational brands whose purchasing practices shape the terms of participation for African smallholders. The interaction between these forces reveals that sustainability is not merely a technical or environmental concern but a terrain of political economy in which power is exercised, value is extracted and agency is unevenly distributed.

US cotton subsidies have long depressed world prices, undermining the competitiveness of African producers despite their high agronomic efficiency. At the same time, BCI’s governance model consolidates influence among Northern actors, enabling global brands to claim sustainability credentials without guaranteeing meaningful benefits for farmers. CmiA, by contrast, attempts to re‑centre African producers within the sustainability landscape, yet it operates within structural constraints not of its own making. Understanding these dynamics is essential for any attempt to build a more equitable cotton economy in Africa, one in which sustainability is not a marketing device but a pathway toward genuine redistribution of value and power.

The political economy of cotton has been widely examined in development economics, trade policy analysis and global value chain studies. A substantial body of literature highlights the distorting effects of US cotton subsidies on global markets. Baffes (2005) demonstrates that US support mechanisms, including direct payments and counter‑cyclical subsidies, depress world prices by encouraging overproduction. Oxfam (2002) argues that these distortions disproportionately harm West and Central African producers, who are among the most efficient cotton growers globally but lack the fiscal capacity to subsidise their own farmers. The WTO ruling in the Brazil–US cotton dispute further confirmed that American subsidies created measurable trade distortions, although subsequent reforms have not fundamentally altered the structure of support (WTO, 2004).

Parallel to this, scholars have examined the rise of sustainability standards as governance mechanisms within global value chains. Ponte (2019) argues that sustainability certification often reinforces existing power asymmetries by embedding the priorities of global buyers rather than those of producers. Riisgaard (2009) similarly notes that private standards can shift compliance costs onto suppliers while enabling brands to capture reputational benefits. In the cotton sector, BCI has been analysed as a buyer‑driven initiative that prioritises scalability and brand participation over traceability and producer empowerment. Its mass‑balance system, which allows certified and non‑certified cotton to be mixed, has been criticised for diluting accountability and enabling brands to claim sustainability without transforming purchasing practices.

In contrast, CmiA has received attention for its more producer‑centred approach. Bassett (2010) highlights that African cotton sectors have historically been shaped by state‑producer relationships and cooperative structures, making them particularly sensitive to global price fluctuations. CmiA’s model, which links certification more directly to origin and provides premiums and community investments, has been interpreted as an attempt to strengthen producer agency within a global market dominated by Northern buyers. However, even supportive analyses acknowledge that CmiA operates within a broader system still shaped by US subsidies and global brand power, limiting its ability to transform structural inequalities.

Together, this literature demonstrates that cotton sustainability cannot be understood in isolation from global trade policy or the governance structures of multinational brands. Instead, it must be analysed as part of a broader political economy in which standards, subsidies and market power intersect to shape the livelihoods of African smallholders.

This analysis draws on four complementary theoretical traditions to illuminate the power dynamics embedded in cotton sustainability regimes. Foucault’s concept of governmentality provides a lens for understanding sustainability standards as disciplinary mechanisms that shape the conduct of producers through training, monitoring and data reporting. BCI’s requirements function as technologies of governance that normalise particular forms of agricultural practice while obscuring the power relations that determine who sets the standards and who must comply with them.

Harvey’s theory of accumulation by dispossession offers a framework for interpreting US cotton subsidies as mechanisms through which wealth is transferred from unsubsidised producers in the Global South to subsidised producers in the Global North. By depressing world prices, US policy extracts value from African farmers, who receive lower incomes despite their efficiency. This process is not accidental but embedded in the political economy of US agricultural policy, which prioritises domestic interests at the expense of global equity.

Peck’s notion of variegated capitalism situates African cotton production within a global system characterised by uneven development and differentiated regulatory environments. African producers operate within a context of limited state support, volatile prices and constrained bargaining power, while Northern actors benefit from robust subsidies, institutional capacity and control over value chain governance. Sustainability standards such as BCI and CmiA must therefore be understood within this broader landscape of uneven capitalist development.

Finally, O’Neil’s work on algorithmic governance highlights the role of data in shaping sustainability regimes. BCI’s reliance on data reporting and digital traceability systems creates new forms of surveillance and accountability that disproportionately burden producers while granting brands greater visibility and control. These systems can reproduce existing inequalities by embedding the assumptions and priorities of Northern actors within the algorithms that govern certification.

Together, these theoretical perspectives reveal that sustainability in the cotton sector is not a neutral or technical domain but a field of power in which governance, value extraction and global inequality are reproduced.

Case Studies: Cotton in Mali, Burkina Faso and Zambia

The experience of cotton producers in Mali, Burkina Faso and Zambia illustrates the uneven impacts of global cotton governance. In Mali, cotton has long been central to rural livelihoods, with state‑producer relationships structured around parastatal companies that provide inputs and guarantee purchase. Yet world price volatility, driven in part by US subsidies, has undermined the financial stability of these systems. Producers face declining incomes despite high efficiency, and sustainability certification has not compensated for these losses.

Burkina Faso’s experience with genetically modified cotton further highlights the vulnerability of African producers to global market dynamics. After initial adoption, concerns about fibre quality led to the withdrawal of GM cotton, illustrating how global buyer preferences can shape national agricultural policy. BCI certification expanded during this period, yet producers reported limited financial benefits, as the mass‑balance system did not guarantee premiums.

Zambia presents a contrasting case in which CmiA has gained significant traction. Producers participating in CmiA report more stable demand and modest premiums, as well as community investments funded through the initiative. However, these gains remain constrained by global price structures and the purchasing practices of multinational buyers, which continue to prioritise cost over equity.

These case studies demonstrate that sustainability certification cannot compensate for the structural disadvantages created by US subsidies and global brand governance. While CmiA offers a more equitable model, its impact is limited by the broader political economy of cotton.

To conclude this report has shown that sustainability in the cotton sector is not a neutral or technical domain, but a field of power shaped by US agricultural policy, global brand governance and competing certification regimes. US subsidies depress world prices and undermine African competitiveness; BCI reinforces buyer‑driven governance that shifts costs onto producers; and CmiA offers a more producer‑centred model but remains constrained by the broader political economy of cotton. Achieving equity in African cotton markets requires more than improved sustainability standards. It demands structural reforms to global trade policy, greater producer participation in sustainability governance and a reorientation of value chains toward transparency, traceability and fair compensation. Only then can sustainability function not as a marketing device but as a pathway toward genuine redistribution of value and agency.

References

Baffes, J. (2005) ‘The Cotton Problem’, World Bank Research Observer, 20(1), pp. 109–144.

Bassett, T. (2010) The Political Ecology of Cotton in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foucault, M. (1991) ‘Governmentality’, in Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. (eds.) The Foucault Effect. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Harvey, D. (2003) The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O’Neil, C. (2016) Weapons of Math Destruction. New York: Crown.

Oxfam International (2002) Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of US Cotton Subsidies on Africa. Oxford: Oxfam.

Peck, J. (2010) Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ponte, S. (2019) Business, Power and Sustainability in a World of Global Value Chains. London: Zed Books.

Riisgaard, L. (2009) ‘Global Value Chains, Labour Organisation and Private Social Standards: Lessons from East African Cut Flower Industries’, World Development, 37(2), pp. 326–340.

Sumner, D. (2006) ‘Reducing Cotton Subsidies: The DDA Cotton Initiative’, The World Economy, 29(4), pp. 475–501.

WTO (2004) United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Report of the Panel. Geneva: World Trade Organization.