The AGOA Moment and Its Collapse: Dependency, Extraction, and the Failure of Textile‑Led Development

Abstract

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been widely celebrated as a cornerstone of U.S.–Africa economic cooperation, promising export‑led growth, industrial upgrading, and poverty reduction across the continent. Yet two decades of empirical evidence reveal that AGOA has entrenched structural dependency rather than alleviating it. At Loveititstitchkeepit.com we argue that AGOA’s institutional design—its unilateral preference structure, restrictive rules of origin, and reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI) in low‑wage assembly—has systematically constrained African industrialisation. Drawing on an integrated framework that combines International Political Economy (IPE) with Global Value Chain and Global Production Network (GVC/GPN) analysis, we paper demonstrate how macro‑level power asymmetries shape micro‑level value capture dynamics within African textile and apparel sectors. Using a qualitative methodology grounded in comparative political economy, document analysis, and synthesis of empirical studies, we show that AGOA generated export growth without structural transformation, facilitated the dominance of footloose foreign firms, and produced extensive value leakage through profit repatriation, tax incentives, and imported inputs. The United Nations’ optimistic framing of textile‑led development is contrasted with empirical evidence showing limited technological upgrading, weak domestic linkages, and persistent poverty among workers. Lveitstitchitkeepit.com concludes that AGOA’s collapse is not an aberration but the predictable outcome of a regime designed to preserve U.S. structural power while positioning African economies as low‑value nodes in global production networks. We argue for a reorientation toward regional value chains, policy autonomy, and industrial strategies that prioritise domestic capability building over externally imposed trade preferences.

Introduction

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has long occupied a privileged place in the discourse of U.S.–Africa economic relations. Introduced in 2000 and repeatedly renewed, AGOA was framed as a transformative opportunity for African countries to integrate into global markets, diversify exports, attract foreign investment, and accelerate industrialisation. Its advocates in Washington, multilateral institutions, and sections of African political elites presented it as a benevolent gesture: a unilateral opening of the U.S. market designed to support African development. Yet beneath this narrative lies a more complex and troubling reality. AGOA’s institutional architecture reflects the structural asymmetries of the global economy, embedding African countries in a regime that offers market access while constraining the policy space necessary for genuine industrial transformation.

Loveitstitchitkeepit.com interrogate the “AGOA moment” and its collapse through a combined International Political Economy (IPE) and Global Value Chain/Global Production Network (GVC/GPN) lens. The central argument is that AGOA did not fail because of poor implementation or insufficient commitment from African governments. Rather, it failed because it was never designed to produce structural transformation. Its unilateral preference structure, restrictive rules of origin, and reliance on footloose foreign direct investment created a pattern of dependency that mirrors earlier forms of post‑colonial economic governance. As Joseph Stiglitz has argued, trade regimes shaped by powerful states often limit the developmental possibilities of weaker ones by imposing conditions that restrict industrial policy, undermine domestic capability building, and reinforce unequal patterns of value capture. AGOA exemplifies this dynamic.

The textile and apparel sector provides a particularly revealing case through which to examine AGOA’s political economy. It was the flagship sector of the programme, the one most frequently cited by policymakers and development agencies as evidence of AGOA’s success. Factories opened in Lesotho, Kenya, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Eswatini, employing hundreds of thousands of workers and generating export surges in the early 2000s. Yet these gains proved fragile and superficial. Empirical studies show that the sector remained dominated by foreign firms, primarily from Asia, which were attracted by temporary trade preferences and generous tax incentives rather than long‑term industrial prospects. These firms imported most of their inputs, repatriated profits, and relocated when conditions changed, leaving behind little domestic capability or technological upgrading. The result was a pattern of export growth without transformation—a phenomenon well documented in the GVC/GPN literature.

The collapse of AGOA’s promise is therefore not a sudden event tied to recent political debates in Washington. It is the culmination of structural contradictions embedded in the programme from its inception. The United States retained the unilateral authority to grant or withdraw preferences, creating chronic uncertainty for African producers. Rules of origin prevented the development of integrated textile industries, locking African firms into low‑value assembly roles. FDI inflows generated employment but limited learning, weak linkages, and extensive value leakage. Meanwhile, the United Nations and other development institutions continued to promote textile‑led industrialisation as a pathway to poverty reduction, despite mounting empirical evidence that such strategies rarely produce sustainable development in the absence of strong domestic industrial policy.

Loveitstitchitkeepit.com seeks to explain why AGOA failed to deliver on its developmental promises and how its institutional design reproduced dependency and extraction. We ask: Why did AGOA generate export growth without structural transformation, and how did its governance structure shape value capture within African textile and apparel sectors? To answer this question, we integrate IPE’s focus on structural power and dependency with GVC/GPN analysis of chain governance, upgrading dynamics, and embeddedness. This combined framework allows for a multi‑scalar analysis that connects the geopolitical logic of U.S. trade policy to the everyday realities of African factories, workers, and firms.

Our argument unfolds in several steps. The next section develops the theoretical framework, outlining how IPE and GVC/GPN scholarship can be synthesised to analyse AGOA’s political economy. The methodology section explains the qualitative, comparative approach used to synthesise empirical studies and policy documents. The empirical analysis examines AGOA’s impact on export performance, rules of origin, FDI dynamics, labour regimes, and value capture. The discussion section draws together these findings to show how AGOA’s institutional design systematically constrained African industrialisation. The conclusion argues that AGOA’s collapse should be understood as an opportunity to rethink Africa’s position in global production networks and to pursue industrial strategies grounded in regional integration, policy autonomy, and domestic capability building.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analytical foundation rest on a synthesis of International Political Economy (IPE) and Global Value Chain/Global Production Network (GVC/GPN) scholarship. Each field offers distinct but complementary insights into the political, institutional, and structural forces that shape African industrialisation under AGOA. IPE foregrounds the asymmetries of power embedded in global trade regimes, the constraints imposed on policy autonomy, and the ways in which dominant states use economic instruments to reproduce geopolitical influence. GVC/GPN analysis, by contrast, illuminates the micro‑level dynamics of production, governance, and value capture within global industries. Together, these frameworks allow for a multi‑scalar analysis that connects the macro‑political logic of AGOA to the everyday realities of African factories, workers, and firms.

International Political Economy: Structural Power, Dependency, and Unequal Exchange

IPE provides the conceptual tools to understand AGOA as a political project rather than a neutral economic instrument. From a structuralist perspective, global trade regimes are not simply mechanisms for efficiency or comparative advantage; they are institutional expressions of power. Susan Strange’s notion of structural power—the ability to shape the rules of the game—captures the essence of AGOA’s unilateral design. The United States determines eligibility, sets the conditions for participation, and reserves the right to suspend or revoke preferences. This asymmetry creates a hierarchy in which African states remain policy‑takers rather than policy‑makers.

Dependency theory, though often dismissed in mainstream economics, remains analytically relevant in explaining the patterns of extraction and subordination embedded in AGOA. The core insight of dependency theorists such as Cardoso and Faletto—that peripheral economies are integrated into global markets in ways that reproduce their subordinate position—resonates strongly with the empirical outcomes of AGOA. African countries gained access to the U.S. market, but under conditions that limited their ability to develop domestic industries, diversify production, or upgrade technologically. The result is a form of dependent integration: participation in global trade without the structural transformation necessary for autonomous development.

Joseph Stiglitz’s critique of asymmetric globalisation reinforces this perspective. Stiglitz argues that trade agreements designed by powerful states often restrict the policy space of developing countries, preventing them from using the same industrial strategies that enabled earlier industrialisers to succeed. AGOA exemplifies this contradiction. While presented as a development tool, it imposes conditions that undermine the very industrial policies—such as infant industry protection, local content requirements, and strategic state intervention—that historically enabled industrialisation in East Asia. In this sense, AGOA is not a deviation from global trade norms but a continuation of a broader pattern in which the rules of globalisation are written to preserve the advantages of dominant economies.

Global Value Chains and Global Production Networks: Governance, Upgrading, and Embeddedness

While IPE explains the macro‑political logic of AGOA, GVC/GPN analysis provides the conceptual apparatus to examine how these macro‑structures shape firm‑level and sectoral outcomes. The textile and apparel sector is a classic example of a buyer‑driven value chain, characterised by powerful lead firms—global brands and retailers—that control design, marketing, and distribution while outsourcing production to low‑wage suppliers. Gereffi’s foundational work on GVC governance shows that in such chains, suppliers face intense cost pressures and limited opportunities for upgrading. African apparel producers under AGOA operate within this governance structure, which constrains their ability to move beyond low‑value assembly.

The concept of upgrading—process, product, functional, and inter‑sectoral—has been central to GVC scholarship. Yet empirical studies of African apparel sectors consistently show limited upgrading under AGOA. Staritz and Morris demonstrate that while some firms improved efficiency, few achieved functional upgrading into design, branding, or higher‑value activities. This stagnation is not merely the result of firm‑level weaknesses but is structurally embedded in the governance of the chain. Lead firms retain control over high‑value functions, while suppliers in Africa remain locked into labour‑intensive, low‑margin production.

GPN scholarship adds further nuance by emphasising the importance of embeddedness—how firms are situated within local institutional, social, and political contexts. African apparel sectors under AGOA exhibit weak domestic embeddedness. Foreign firms dominate production, import most inputs, and repatriate profits, resulting in limited linkages to local economies. Whitfield and colleagues show that in Ethiopia’s industrial parks, foreign investors operate in enclaves with minimal integration into domestic supply chains. This lack of embeddedness undermines the potential for learning, technological diffusion, and long‑term industrial development.

Milberg and Winkler’s work on value capture further illuminates the dynamics of extraction within global production networks. They argue that the distribution of value within GVCs is shaped not only by firm capabilities but by institutional and political factors. Under AGOA, rules of origin, tax incentives, and the dominance of foreign firms create a structure in which value systematically leaks out of African economies. The result is a pattern of participation without capture: African countries are integrated into global production but capture only a small fraction of the value generated.

Synthesising IPE and GVC/GPN: A Multi‑Scalar Framework for Understanding AGOA

The synthesis of IPE and GVC/GPN frameworks allows for a more comprehensive analysis of AGOA’s political economy. IPE highlights the structural power of the United States and the geopolitical logic behind AGOA’s design. GVC/GPN analysis reveals how these macro‑level structures shape the governance of production networks, the distribution of value, and the possibilities for upgrading within African apparel sectors. Together, they show that AGOA’s failure to generate structural transformation is not an anomaly but the predictable outcome of a regime that integrates African economies into global markets on terms that preserve their subordinate position.

This combined framework also illuminates the contradictions in the development narratives promoted by the United Nations and other institutions. While these organisations emphasise the potential of textile‑led industrialisation, they often overlook the structural constraints imposed by global value chain governance and the political economy of trade preferences. By situating AGOA within both global power structures and production network dynamics, Loveitstitchitkeepit.com provide a more holistic understanding of why export growth did not translate into industrial upgrading or poverty reduction.

METHODOLOGY

We employ a qualitative, comparative political economy methodology grounded in the synthesis of International Political Economy (IPE) and Global Value Chain/Global Production Network (GVC/GPN) frameworks. The methodological approach is designed to illuminate the multi‑scalar dynamics through which AGOA’s institutional architecture shapes industrial outcomes in African textile and apparel sectors. Rather than relying on econometric modelling or single‑country case studies, the paper draws on a triangulated body of evidence that includes peer‑reviewed empirical research, trade and investment data, policy documents, and institutional reports. This approach allows for a holistic analysis of AGOA’s political economy, capturing both the macro‑level structures of power and the micro‑level dynamics of production and value capture.

The first methodological pillar is comparative political economy, which provides the tools to analyse AGOA as a political institution embedded in broader geopolitical and economic structures. This involves examining the legislative design of AGOA, the conditionalities attached to eligibility, and the political motivations underlying U.S. trade policy. Document analysis of AGOA legislation, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) reports, Congressional testimonies, and African government submissions enables a detailed understanding of the institutional logic of the programme. This is complemented by analysis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports, which provide insight into the development narratives that have shaped international support for textile‑led industrialisation.

The second methodological pillar is GVC/GPN analysis, which focuses on the governance structures, upgrading trajectories, and value capture dynamics within global textile and apparel production networks. This involves synthesising firm‑level and sectoral studies conducted in key AGOA‑participating countries such as Lesotho, Kenya, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Eswatini. These studies include ethnographic research, interviews with managers and workers, production data, and analyses of supply chain governance. By integrating findings from multiple country contexts, the methodology avoids the limitations of single‑site analysis and instead identifies structural patterns that transcend national boundaries.

A third methodological component is triangulation across diverse empirical sources. The paper draws on quantitative trade data from the World Bank, UN Comtrade, and national statistical agencies to contextualise export trends and sectoral performance. However, the primary emphasis is on qualitative evidence, which is better suited to capturing the institutional, political, and relational dynamics that shape industrial outcomes. Empirical studies by Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, Staritz and Morris, Whitfield and colleagues, Kaplinsky and Morris, and others provide detailed insights into the functioning of apparel factories, the behaviour of foreign investors, and the constraints faced by domestic firms. These studies are complemented by labour‑focused research that documents working conditions, wage structures, and the social reproduction dynamics of apparel workers.

The methodological choice to prioritise qualitative synthesis over econometric modelling is deliberate. AGOA’s impact cannot be adequately captured through export volumes or employment figures alone. Such metrics obscure the underlying dynamics of dependency, value leakage, and structural constraints that shape long‑term development trajectories. A qualitative, multi‑scalar approach allows for a more nuanced analysis that connects macro‑level power structures to micro‑level production realities. It also enables the integration of critical perspectives—such as dependency theory and structuralist critiques of globalisation—that are often marginalised in quantitative policy evaluations.

The methodology also acknowledges the limitations inherent in studying global production networks. Data on profit repatriation, transfer pricing, and intra‑firm transactions are often opaque, limiting the ability to quantify value leakage precisely. Similarly, the dominance of foreign firms in African apparel sectors means that much of the relevant data is proprietary and inaccessible. To address these limitations, the paper relies on triangulation across multiple studies, each of which provides partial insights into the dynamics of value capture. By synthesising these findings, the analysis constructs a coherent picture of the structural constraints that shape African industrialisation under AGOA.

Finally, the methodology is informed by a critical epistemological stance that recognises the political nature of development knowledge. Official evaluations of AGOA, particularly those produced by U.S. agencies and multilateral institutions, often reflect the interests and assumptions of dominant actors. By contrast, this study foregrounds empirical research conducted by scholars working within African contexts, labour‑focused organisations, and critical development economists. This approach ensures that the analysis is grounded in the lived realities of workers and firms rather than in the abstract metrics of trade performance.

In sum, the methodology combines comparative political economy, GVC/GPN analysis, and qualitative triangulation to provide a comprehensive and critical examination of AGOA’s political economy. This approach enables the paper to move beyond surface‑level assessments of export growth and employment generation, revealing the deeper structural dynamics that have shaped the trajectory of African textile and apparel sectors under AGOA.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The empirical analysis examines the political economy of AGOA through the intertwined lenses of structural power, global production network governance, and the lived realities of African textile and apparel sectors. The section is organised around five core dynamics that emerge consistently across the literature: export growth without transformation, restrictive rules of origin, the dominance of footloose foreign direct investment, labour regimes shaped by global buyer power, and the disjuncture between development narratives and empirical outcomes. Together, these dynamics reveal how AGOA’s institutional design produced a pattern of dependent integration rather than structural transformation.

1. Export Growth Without Structural Transformation

AGOA’s early years witnessed a dramatic surge in apparel exports from several African countries. Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, and Swaziland (now Eswatini) became prominent suppliers to U.S. retailers, with apparel exports increasing by over 300 per cent in some cases during the early 2000s. This export boom was frequently cited by policymakers and development agencies as evidence of AGOA’s success. However, empirical studies reveal that these gains were shallow, fragile, and disconnected from broader industrial development.

Frazer and Van Biesebroeck’s (2010) analysis of firm‑level export data demonstrates that while AGOA increased export volumes, it did not stimulate domestic investment or technological upgrading. Export growth was driven primarily by foreign firms that entered African markets to exploit temporary trade preferences rather than long‑term industrial potential. When the Multi‑Fibre Arrangement (MFA) expired in 2005, many of these firms relocated to Asia, where production costs were lower and supply chains more developed. The result was a sharp decline in exports from several AGOA‑participating countries, revealing the fragility of the gains achieved under the programme.

Brambilla et al. (2019) further show that AGOA’s impact on employment and wages was limited. While apparel employment increased during the export boom, wages remained low, working conditions precarious, and job security minimal. Moreover, the employment gains were concentrated in a narrow segment of the labour force—primarily young women working in low‑skill assembly roles. These jobs did not provide pathways to higher‑skill or higher‑wage employment, nor did they contribute to broader industrial upgrading.

The export boom therefore did not translate into structural transformation. It generated short‑term gains that were highly sensitive to global market conditions and dependent on foreign firms. This pattern aligns with the broader critique of export‑processing‑zone‑led development, which often produces enclaves of production disconnected from domestic economies.

2. Rules of Origin as Structural Constraints

AGOA’s rules of origin (ROO) are among the most significant institutional constraints shaping African apparel sectors. While the “third‑country fabric provision” temporarily relaxed input requirements, the broader ROO framework ensured that African producers remained dependent on imported inputs. Staritz and Morris (2013) show that ROO prevented the development of integrated textile industries by requiring that yarns and fabrics be sourced from the United States or other AGOA‑eligible countries under restrictive conditions. This structure locked African firms into low‑value assembly roles and prevented backward linkages into textile production.

Gibbon (2008) argues that ROO function as a form of industrial policy—one that benefits U.S. textile producers and global suppliers in Asia rather than African firms. By restricting the use of locally produced inputs, ROO undermine the potential for domestic capability building and technological upgrading. They also increase production costs and reduce competitiveness, making African firms vulnerable to shifts in global demand and competition from more integrated producers in Asia.

The political economy of ROO reflects the structural power of the United States within the global trading system. As Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) argue, powerful states often design trade regimes that preserve their own industrial advantages while limiting the policy space of developing countries. AGOA’s ROO exemplify this dynamic, shaping the governance of African apparel production in ways that reinforce dependency and limit upgrading.

3. Foreign Direct Investment, Footloose Capital, and Value Leakage

FDI played a central role in AGOA’s apparel sectors, but its developmental impact was limited by the dominance of footloose foreign firms and extensive value leakage. Whitfield et al. (2020) show that in Ethiopia’s industrial parks, foreign investors—primarily from China, India, and Sri Lanka—benefited from generous tax incentives, subsidised infrastructure, and preferential access to land. However, these firms imported most of their inputs, employed expatriate managers, and repatriated profits, resulting in minimal domestic value capture.

Newman et al. (2016) similarly find that FDI in African manufacturing often fails to generate significant spillovers. Foreign firms tend to operate in enclaves, with limited linkages to domestic suppliers or labour markets. They also engage in transfer pricing and other practices that reduce taxable income, further limiting the fiscal benefits to host countries. The result is a pattern of participation without capture: African countries host production but capture only a small fraction of the value generated.

This dynamic is consistent with Milberg and Winkler’s (2013) analysis of value capture in global production networks. They argue that the distribution of value is shaped by institutional and political factors, including tax regimes, investment incentives, and the governance structures of global value chains. Under AGOA, these factors combine to create a structure in which value systematically leaks out of African economies.

The footloose nature of FDI also undermines the sustainability of industrial development. When trade preferences change, wages rise, or incentives expire, foreign firms relocate to more favourable environments. This pattern was evident after the expiration of the MFA, when many firms left AGOA‑participating countries for Asia. The result is a cycle of investment and disinvestment that prevents the accumulation of domestic capabilities and undermines long‑term industrialisation.

4. Labour Regimes and Social Downgrading

The labour regimes that emerged under AGOA reflect the governance structures of global apparel value chains, which prioritise low costs, flexibility, and rapid turnaround times. Mezzadri (2017) and Rossi (2013) document how global buyers impose cost pressures that lead to precarious working conditions, low wages, and limited labour rights. These dynamics are evident in African apparel sectors, where workers—primarily young women—face long hours, limited job security, and inadequate social protections.

In Lesotho, for example, workers in AGOA‑linked factories reported wages barely above subsistence levels, limited opportunities for advancement, and frequent violations of labour rights. Similar conditions were documented in Kenya, Madagascar, and Ethiopia. These labour regimes reflect the broader dynamics of buyer‑driven value chains, in which lead firms capture high value while suppliers compete on the basis of low labour costs.

The social downgrading observed in AGOA‑participating countries challenges the narrative that textile‑led industrialisation reduces poverty. While apparel jobs may provide income for workers who would otherwise be unemployed, the precarious nature of these jobs and the absence of upward mobility limit their developmental impact. Moreover, the concentration of employment in low‑skill assembly roles reinforces gendered patterns of labour exploitation, with women disproportionately represented in the most precarious segments of the workforce.

5. Development Narratives vs. Empirical Realities

The United Nations and other development institutions have consistently promoted textile and apparel investment as a pathway to industrialisation and poverty reduction. UNCTAD reports highlight the potential for job creation, export growth, and integration into global value chains. However, empirical evidence from AGOA‑participating countries contradicts these optimistic narratives.

Kaplinsky and Morris (2008) argue that African apparel sectors face structural constraints that limit their ability to compete with more integrated producers in Asia. These constraints include weak infrastructure, limited access to finance, and the absence of domestic textile industries. While AGOA provided temporary market access, it did not address these underlying structural challenges.

Stiglitz (2017) critiques the broader development model that underpins these narratives, arguing that export‑processing‑zone‑led industrialisation rarely produces sustainable development. Without strong domestic industrial policies, technological upgrading, and regional integration, such strategies generate enclaves of production that are vulnerable to global market fluctuations and dominated by foreign firms.

The disjuncture between development narratives and empirical realities reflects the political economy of development knowledge. Official evaluations of AGOA often emphasise export growth and employment generation while overlooking the structural constraints that limit long‑term development. By contrast, empirical studies conducted within African contexts reveal a more complex and troubling picture of dependency, value leakage, and limited upgrading.

DISCUSSION

The empirical analysis reveals a consistent pattern: AGOA generated participation without transformation, integration without upgrading, and employment without empowerment. This section synthesises these findings through the combined lens of International Political Economy (IPE) and Global Value Chain/Global Production Network (GVC/GPN) analysis, demonstrating how AGOA’s institutional design reproduced dependency and constrained African industrialisation. The discussion highlights the multi‑scalar nature of these dynamics, showing how macro‑level power structures shape micro‑level production realities and how global narratives of development obscure the structural constraints embedded in trade regimes.

At the macro level, AGOA reflects the structural power of the United States within the global trading system. Its unilateral preference structure, political conditionalities, and restrictive rules of origin embody the asymmetries that Stiglitz identifies as characteristic of contemporary globalisation. These institutional features limit the policy space of African states, preventing them from adopting the industrial strategies that historically enabled successful late industrialisers. The ability of the United States to grant or withdraw preferences at will creates chronic uncertainty, discouraging long‑term investment and reinforcing dependency. This dynamic is not incidental but intrinsic to the design of AGOA, which positions African countries as recipients of benevolence rather than autonomous economic actors.

At the meso level, the governance structures of global apparel value chains further constrain African industrialisation. Buyer‑driven chains, dominated by powerful global brands and retailers, impose cost pressures that limit the ability of suppliers to upgrade. African firms, operating within the constraints of AGOA’s rules of origin and facing competition from more integrated producers in Asia, remain locked into low‑value assembly roles. The dominance of foreign firms exacerbates this dynamic, as these firms have little incentive to invest in local capabilities or integrate into domestic economies. The result is a pattern of enclave industrialisation, in which production occurs within isolated pockets that are disconnected from broader economic structures.

At the micro level, the labour regimes that emerge under AGOA reflect the broader dynamics of global production networks. Workers—primarily young women—face precarious employment, low wages, and limited opportunities for advancement. These conditions are not simply the result of local labour market dynamics but are shaped by the governance structures of global value chains, which prioritise flexibility, low costs, and rapid turnaround times. The social downgrading observed in AGOA‑participating countries challenges the narrative that textile‑led industrialisation reduces poverty. While apparel jobs may provide income, they do not offer pathways to economic security or social mobility.

The discussion also highlights the disjuncture between development narratives and empirical realities. The United Nations and other development institutions have consistently promoted textile and apparel investment as a pathway to industrialisation and poverty reduction. However, these narratives often overlook the structural constraints imposed by global value chain governance and the political economy of trade preferences. The empirical evidence from AGOA‑participating countries reveals that textile‑led industrialisation, in the absence of strong domestic industrial policies and regional integration, generates limited developmental benefits. The persistence of these narratives reflects the political economy of development knowledge, in which the interests and assumptions of dominant actors shape the framing of development strategies.

The synthesis of IPE and GVC/GPN frameworks provides a more holistic understanding of AGOA’s political economy. IPE highlights the structural power of the United States and the geopolitical logic behind AGOA’s design, while GVC/GPN analysis reveals how these macro‑level structures shape the governance of production networks and the distribution of value. Together, these frameworks show that AGOA’s failure to generate structural transformation is not an anomaly but the predictable outcome of a regime that integrates African economies into global markets on terms that preserve their subordinate position.

Our analysis also has broader implications for African industrial policy. The experience of AGOA demonstrates that market access alone is insufficient to generate industrialisation. Without domestic capability building, technological upgrading, and regional value chain development, participation in global production networks will continue to produce limited developmental benefits. African countries need policy space to implement industrial strategies that prioritise domestic value creation over external dependency. This includes the ability to use local content requirements, infant industry protection, and strategic state intervention—tools that were central to the industrialisation of East Asia but are often restricted under contemporary trade regimes.

The collapse of the “AGOA moment” therefore presents an opportunity to rethink Africa’s position in the global economy. Rather than relying on externally imposed trade preferences, African countries can pursue strategies that prioritise regional integration, domestic capability building, and industrial upgrading. This requires a shift away from the enclave model of export‑processing‑zone‑led development and toward a more holistic approach that integrates industrial policy, labour rights, and social development. It also requires challenging the development narratives that have long justified extractive forms of integration into global markets.

In sum, the discussion shows that AGOA’s institutional design, combined with the governance structures of global apparel value chains, produced a pattern of dependent integration that limited the potential for structural transformation. The programme’s collapse is not a failure of implementation, but a reflection of the structural constraints embedded in its design. Understanding these dynamics is essential for developing alternative strategies that prioritise African agency, autonomy, and industrial development.

CONCLUSION

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was introduced with the promise of transforming African economies through export‑led growth, foreign investment, and integration into global markets. Yet two decades of empirical evidence reveal that AGOA did not generate the structural transformation that its architects envisioned. Instead, it entrenched a pattern of dependent integration that mirrors earlier forms of post‑colonial economic governance. This paper has shown that AGOA’s institutional design—its unilateral preference structure, restrictive rules of origin, and reliance on footloose foreign direct investment—systematically constrained African industrialisation. These constraints were not incidental but intrinsic to the political economy of the programme.

By synthesising International Political Economy (IPE) and Global Value Chain/Global Production Network (GVC/GPN) frameworks, Loveitstitchitkeepit.com has demonstrated how macro‑level power asymmetries shape micro‑level production dynamics. IPE highlights the structural power of the United States and the geopolitical logic behind AGOA’s design, while GVC/GPN analysis reveals how these macro‑structures shape the governance of production networks, the distribution of value, and the possibilities for upgrading within African apparel sectors. Together, these frameworks show that AGOA’s failure to generate structural transformation is not an anomaly but the predictable outcome of a regime that integrates African economies into global markets on terms that preserve their subordinate position.

The empirical analysis revealed five core dynamics. First, AGOA generated export growth without structural transformation, as foreign firms dominated production and relocated when conditions changed. Second, restrictive rules of origin prevented the development of integrated textile industries, locking African firms into low‑value assembly roles. Third, foreign direct investment produced limited spillovers and extensive value leakage, as profits were repatriated and inputs imported. Fourth, labour regimes reflected the governance structures of global apparel value chains, producing precarious employment and social downgrading. Finally, development narratives promoted by the United Nations and other institutions were contradicted by empirical realities, revealing a persistent disjuncture between policy rhetoric and structural constraints.

The collapse of the “AGOA moment” should therefore be understood not as a failure of implementation but as a reflection of the structural contradictions embedded in the programme’s design. AGOA offered market access without policy autonomy, participation without value capture, and employment without empowerment. Its expiration debates in Washington underscore the fragility of a development model dependent on the political whims of a foreign government.

The findings of this paper have important implications for African industrial policy. Market access alone is insufficient to generate industrialisation. Without domestic capability building, technological upgrading, and regional value chain development, participation in global production networks will continue to produce limited developmental benefits. African countries need policy space to implement industrial strategies that prioritise domestic value creation over external dependency. This includes the ability to use local content requirements, infant industry protection, and strategic state intervention—tools that were central to the industrialisation of East Asia but are often restricted under contemporary trade regimes.

The collapse of AGOA presents an opportunity to rethink Africa’s position in the global economy. Rather than relying on externally imposed trade preferences, African countries can pursue strategies that prioritise regional integration, domestic capability building, and industrial upgrading. This requires challenging the development narratives that have long justified extractive forms of integration into global markets and embracing a more holistic approach that integrates industrial policy, labour rights, and social development.

In conclusion, AGOA’s legacy is a cautionary tale about the limits of trade‑as‑development and the dangers of relying on externally designed economic regimes. Its collapse opens space for new forms of industrial strategy grounded in African agency, autonomy, and structural transformation. The challenge now is to seize this moment to build industrial futures that are not dependent on the benevolence of external powers but rooted in the capabilities, aspirations, and sovereignty of African economies.

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